After Myonessus in 190 BCE, L. Scipio and Eumenes II led Roman and Pergamene troops inland across Aeolis and Lydia. With the Hellespont secured by Regillus, the coalition aimed for Antiochus’ main army on the Hermus plain—bridges repaired, granaries tapped, and scouts fanning toward Sardis [2][4].
What Happened
Once the oars fell silent off Myonessus, boots took over. Lucius Cornelius Scipio marched south and east from the Hellespontine towns, gathering supplies near Lampsacus and Elaea before turning inland through Aeolis. Eumenes II rode alongside, pointing out the estates whose barns could be requisitioned and the streams that turned to mud in sudden autumn rain. The route traced a line of names—Adramyttium, Thyateira, the broad valley of the Hermus River—toward Sardis [2][4].
The coalition’s lifeline ran behind them. Regillus’ ships held the Hellespont and Ephesus’ approaches, ferried couriers, and intimidated coastal garrisons that might otherwise have harassed baggage trains. A campaign that might have starved now hummed; amphorae rattled in wagons, and the creak of axles mixed with the clink of harness. Scarlets and whites marked units in the marching column, a moving geometry across Lydia’s dust [2][4].
Eumenes’ local intelligence mattered. He knew where Seleucid scouts watched from low hills near Magnesia ad Sipylum and where Attalid sympathies could open a gate without a fight. He advised bridging points on the Hermus and the crossing near the road to Magnesia, where flat ground would favor Roman maniples over a phalanx loaded with scythed chariots and elephants. The coalition was not just moving; it was shaping the battlefield to come [2].
Appian reports that Antiochus concentrated his main force—phalanx center, heavy cavalry on the wings, chariots and elephants interspersed—in the region around Magnesia ad Sipylum [4]. Livy, with his eye for the telling prelude, stresses that after sea control, a land decision must follow, and that the Scipios sought it. The march into Lydia was the lever that would pry open a battle on their terms [2].
Villages along the Hermus opened with half-fear, half-relief. Better to surrender grain than face a sack. Pergamene officers posted receipts and sent word back to Pergamon’s accountants; a ledger would survive this war. Roman tribunes marked distances and held councils at crossroads near Smyrna and Sardis, their voices clipped, the business brisk. The campaign moved on time.
By the time the coalition encamped within sight of Mount Sipylus, the plain had a new geometry: ditches marked the Roman front, piles of pila lay in neat stacks, and scouts reported dust plumes from Seleucid foragers. The march from the sea had done its work. Antiochus would have to fight near Magnesia, or concede the West without a blow [2][4].
Why This Matters
The inland advance translated naval dominance into land pressure. By repairing bridges, managing supply, and choosing routes with Pergamene guidance, the coalition framed where the decisive battle would occur. The Hermus valley and Magnesia ad Sipylum were not accidents; they were the culmination of choices made after Myonessus [2][4].
This episode underscores command and logistics as the war’s sinew. Every wagon that rolled from Elaea and every bridge over the Hermus connected sea power to battlefield power. Eumenes II’s role in routing, sourcing, and persuasion shows how allied leverage worked before it was rewarded by Apamea’s allocations [2][6][7].
In the broader story, the march into Lydia was the penultimate move before Magnesia. It put Antiochus on a clock he did not set and led directly to the winter decision that would yield the armistice at Sardis and the treaty at Apamea [2][4][12].
Event in Context
See what happened before and after this event in the timeline
People Involved
Key figures who played a role in Roman–Pergamene March into Lydia
Lucius Cornelius Scipio (Asiaticus)
Lucius Cornelius Scipio, younger brother of Scipio Africanus, served as consul in 190 BCE and commanded the Roman army that crossed into Asia, defeated Antiochus III at Magnesia, and dictated peace at Sardis. Backed by his brother’s counsel and Pergamene and Rhodian allies, he fused coalition logistics with Roman infantry power to force the Treaty of Apamea (188). Granted the agnomen “Asiaticus,” he became the public face of Rome’s first great victory on the far side of the Aegean, the turning point that ended Seleucid rule west of the Taurus without Roman annexation.
Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus
Scipio Africanus, victor of Zama and Rome’s most celebrated general, returned to service in 190 BCE as senior legate to his brother Lucius. From the senate’s command arrangements to the Anatolian march, he shaped a coalition plan that paired Rhodian-Pergamene sea control with Roman infantry on land. Though ill during the Magnesia campaign, his diplomacy helped secure the Armistice at Sardis and the terms that became the Treaty of Apamea. His presence gave the coalition confidence—and gave Rome a template for projecting power east without annexation.
Eumenes II Soter
Eumenes II, king of Pergamon from 197 to 159 BCE, was Rome’s most effective Anatolian partner against Antiochus III. He furnished cavalry, intelligence, and diplomatic glue for the coalition, pressed the Roman advance into Lydia, and helped unhinge the Seleucid left at Magnesia. The Treaty of Apamea rewarded him with most lands west of the Taurus, catapulting Pergamon to regional preeminence. Builder, diplomat, and strategist, he turned one winter’s war into a Pergamene century under Roman protection.
Ask About This Event
Have questions about Roman–Pergamene March into Lydia? Get AI-powered insights based on the event details.