diplomatic

The King’s Peace (Peace of Antalcidas)

Date

-387 — -386

Part of

diplomatic

In 387/6 BCE, the King’s Peace ended the Corinthian War by awarding Asia to Artaxerxes II and declaring ‘autonomy’ for other Greek cities. Sparta emerged as the treaty’s enforcer. The peace was engraved in stone—and in Greek humiliation.

What Happened

The settlement came from Persepolis, not the Peloponnese. After years of indecisive fighting, a text circulated that began, “The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia…should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic cities…to be independent; Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros to belong to Athens; if any do not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him…by land and by sea, with ships and with money” [2].

This was the King’s Peace, known also as the Peace of Antalcidas after the Spartan envoy who helped negotiate it. The azure of the Aegean, site of Cnidus, now mirrored a political sea-law: Persia would control Asia’s Greek cities; Sparta would police ‘autonomy’ among the rest. Athens regained three islands—Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros—an enticement that helped sell the unsavory whole [2][19].

Sparta accepted the role of enforcer with relief and relish. The struggle against a Persian-backed fleet had crippled Spartan sea power; a treaty that replaced hulls with clauses offered a path to maintain primacy. Harmosts and commissioners could now cite ‘autonomy’ to dissolve leagues and block unions. The clink of Persian coin had purchased the text; the thud of Spartan spears would apply it [12][19].

Not all Greeks nodded. Isocrates, an Athenian orator, railed against the terms: the treaty, he complained, had been engraved on stone pillars and set in temples, “a trophy far more glorious for him [the King] than those which are set up on fields of battle” [7]. What seemed practical to Agesilaus sounded like capitulation to others. Plutarch, writing later, called it a mockery—a ‘peace’ worse than war [20].

Xenophon preserves the text without editorial fury, but his silence speaks; the shift from independent Greek decision to Persian arbitration hangs over his pages [2]. In effect, the Great King held a lever over Greece. If a city declined the peace, the clause promised Persian war—by land, by sea, with ships and with money. Spartan hegemony now stood on Persian credit, signed and sealed.

Within months, the enforcement began. In Boeotia and at Corinth, Spartan commissioners cited ‘autonomy’ to break federations and unions. The Cadmeia at Thebes would soon find how far ‘autonomy’ could be stretched when utility, not law, ruled [12][14].

Why This Matters

The King’s Peace reordered the Greek world without a battle. It granted Persia formal authority over Asia’s Greek cities, restored three islands to Athens, and handed Sparta the legal cudgel of ‘autonomy’ to wield against rivals. The Corinthian War ended; a treaty regime began [2][19][12].

This event defines the theme of hegemony on Persian credit. Sparta’s power now depended on Persian arbitration and threat. Isocrates’ anger at the temple inscriptions captured the humiliation: Greek freedom secured by Persian favor. Spartan enforcement of ‘autonomy’ soon revealed that the clause helped one hegemon more than it protected the many [7][12].

In the broader arc, the peace bought Sparta a decade. It stabilized the map while sowing resentment in Boeotia, Corinth, and beyond. The clause would be turned back against Sparta when Thebes, excluded from a later peace in 371, met a Spartan army at Leuctra with a new way of fighting and a revived federation built under the banner of ‘autonomy’ [14][18][19].