military

Agesilaus’s Campaign in Asia Minor

Date

-396 — -394

Part of

military

From 396 to 394 BCE, Agesilaus II crossed the Aegean, drilling troops at Ephesus and striking toward Sardis under a Panhellenic banner. Trumpets sounded freedom for Ionian Greeks—and a warning to Persia. The campaign ended when war at home summoned him back.

What Happened

A Spartan king on Asian soil looked like a reversal of Xerxes’ story. Agesilaus, newly crowned and eager, assembled men and ships at Ephesus, the sacred city of Artemis, promising to free Greek poleis in Asia from Persian satraps [17][6]. Blue sea, white temples, scarlet cloaks: a palette of conquest and piety. Xenophon, who adored the king, later painted him as a man of tireless drill and simple meals [6].

At Ephesus and along the Ionian shore—Priene, Miletus, the road toward Sardis—Agesilaus reworked Spartan muscle for an overseas march. He mixed discipline with theater, staging gymnastic and military festivals to sharpen bodies and break monotony. The soundscape was precise: the snap of bowstrings at practice, the measured clatter of spears on shields at the trumpet’s call [1][6].

Persian satraps like Tissaphernes tested this resolve. Skirmishes around the Hermus valley and toward Sardis revealed the limits of Spartan cavalry and the enduring advantage of Persian horse. Agesilaus adapted, seeking Greek horsemen from allied cities and emphasizing shock infantry where terrain allowed. His eyes turned inland, toward the Lydian capital, counting the days and the supply lines [17].

The campaign carried dual messages. To Ionians in Smyrna and Ephesus, Spartan banners signaled hope that the mainland’s strongest power would commit real force to their cause. To Artaxerxes II in Persepolis, the march announced that Greek politics could spill east whenever Persia meddled west. The Great King listened—and chose a cheaper answer than battle: gold. By 395, Persian silver helped reassemble a coalition of Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and Athens against Sparta, and in 394 a Persian-backed fleet smashed Spartan sea power at Cnidus [15][1].

Agesilaus took the hint from the sea’s report. News of Cnidus crossed the Aegean on fast hulls. The rumble of oarlocks carried a message: return. The Corinthian War had opened on two fronts, and a Spartan king could not linger near Sardis when allies called for help at the Isthmus. He retraced his path to Ephesus, embarked, and sailed west with disciplined haste [1][17].

The Asian venture lasted two years, tallied in seasons and marches: Ephesus to the Hermus, small victories and larger intentions, then the forced return. It proved Sparta could project power beyond the Peloponnese—and that Persia could counter with coin as easily as with cavalry. The next encounter between King and King would not be at Sardis but at a negotiation table, inscribing Asia to Persia and ‘autonomy’ to the Greeks [2][19].

Why This Matters

Agesilaus’s campaign revealed both Sparta’s ambition and its strategic exposure. It offered real assistance to Ionian Greeks, raised Spartan prestige, and threatened Persian satraps. But it also provoked a Persian response that redirected gold to Sparta’s enemies and contributed directly to the Corinthian War that forced Agesilaus home in 394 [15][1][17].

The episode foregrounds hegemony on Persian credit. Even at the height of Spartan confidence, Persian finance and diplomacy offset hoplite prowess. The later King’s Peace would formalize what Cnidus and the coalition had demonstrated in practice: Spartan influence in Greece would endure only with the Great King’s forbearance in Asia [2][12][19].

Within the broader arc, the Asian interlude sharpened Agesilaus’s profile as a king of restless energy and opportunistic morality. His later defense of Phoebidas’s illegal seizure of the Cadmeia as ‘useful’ echoed the campaign’s practical calculus: results first, legality later. That approach kept Sparta on top through the 380s—until Thebes developed both a federation and tactics to break the myth at Leuctra [3][14][18].